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The exploitation of the Soviet Union's foreign trade potential
would necessitate adopting a realistic exchange rate and increas-
ing the foreign exchange retention quotas for direct and indirect
exporters.  It would also require reforms of domestic policies.
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The exploitation of the Soviet Union's foreign  foreign exchange.  At the same time, given the
trade potential would necessitate adopting a  limitations of raising fuel and raw material
realistic exchange rate and increasing the foreign  exports, which presently dominate Soviet
exchange retention quotas for direct and indirect  foreign trade, it would be necessary to increase
exporters.  It would also require reforms of  the exports of mar. factwred  goods, where qual-
domestic policies.  ity provides a constraint. To upgrade quality,
there is need for foreign machinery, the purchase
The first prerequisite is the establishment of  of which would require extemal borrowing and
rational prices.  This objective may be pursued  joint ventures.  It would further be necessary to
by adopting world market prices for raw materi-  decentralize decisionmaking on foreign trade in
als and fuels, having the exporters of manufac-  enlarging the scope of firms that can directly
tured goods receive the prices they obtain  trade abroad.
abroad, setting domestic prices of imports at
world mairet prices plus the tariff, and estab-  The decentralization of decisionmaking in
lishing market clearing prices for manufactured  foreign trade should be accompanied by decen-
goods that are produced and sold domestically.  tralization in the domestic economy, to be
complemented by the introduction of the profit
Eventually, world market prices would be  motive and competition.  In fact, rational prices,
brought to bear on domestic prices in conjunc-  decentralization, profit maximization, incentives
tion with the liberalization of imports, but this  to managers, and competition are interdepend-
will be a long process since the pent-up demand  ent, and they will have to be pursued simultane-
for imports cannot be satisfied from available  ously for efficient resouirce  allocation.
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I.  Introduction
In  his  "Perestroyka  and  the  Foreign  Economic  Ties  of the  USSR,"
prepared  for  the  Conference  on "Prospects  for  and  Implications  of  Greater
East-West  Cooperation,"  Dr.  Popov  has  provided  an  extremely  interesting
discussion  of the  present  situation  in  Soviet  foreign  trade  and  outlined  a new
foreign  economic  strategy  for  the  Soviet  Union. We  will  briefly  summarize  his
conclusions,  with  which  we are in  general  agreement. Next,  we will  examine
the  preconditions  of the  proposed  changes  in terms  of domestic  economic  policy
and  the  measures  that  may be  used  to promote  exports. Finally,  possible
implications  for  CMEA  trade  and for  trade  with  capitalist  countries  and, in
particular,  the  United  States  will  be considered.
Dr.  Popov  notes  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  not  exploited  its  foreign
trade  potential. He adds  that  Soviet  trade  is still  being  carried  out  on the
basis  of "an  archaic,  outmoded  and  essentially  'colonial'  trade  structure"  (p.
4),  which  has  largely  involved  exchanging  fuels  and  raw  materials  for
machinery  and industrial  consumer  goods. In  reference  to the  general
upgrading  and  advance  of  world  trade,  he notes  that  the  "Soviet  Union  has so
far  remained  outside  these  developing  worldwide  economic  processes"  (p.  8).
Dr.  Popov  f  rther  criticizes  the  system  of import  controls,  the  lack  of
convertibility  of the  ruble,  and the  practice  of multiple  exchange  rates  in
the  Soviet  economy.
In connection  with  perestroyka,  Dr.  Popov  notes  that  improvements
have  been  made in  giving  a number  of organizations  the  right  to trade  directly-2-
abroad  and  providing  possibilities  for Joint  ventures. At the  same  time,  he
makes  proposals  for  the  further  development  of  a new foreign  economic  strategy
in  the  Soviet  Union.
The  proposed  new foreign  economic  strategy  would  include  making  the
rubLe  convertible  while  establishing  a system  of customs  duties;  easing  the
conditions  of establishing  joint  ventures  and  setting  up special  economic
zones;  permitting  Soviet  enterprises  to borrow  abroad;  and  making  balance-of-
payments  statistics  freely  available. The  described  changes  aim to  "make  the
Soviet  economy  more  open,  create  a  modern  export  potential,  give  Soviet
producers  entry  onto  foreign  markets  and  attract  foreign  firms  to  participate
in  projects  carried  out  in the  USSR"  (pp.  13-14).
These  are  worthy  objectives  and  one  can  on the  whole  agree  with  the
policies  proposed  to pursue  them. At the  same  time,  consideration  needs  to  be
given  to  domestic  policy  measures  necessary  to support  the  policies  introduced
in  regard  to foreign  economic  relationships.  Also,  policies  to  promote
exports  will  have  to be spelled  out.
Domestic  policies  will  need  to change  in order  to  ensure  efficiency
in  foreign  trade  and  to provide  exports  of high  quality  in  the  Soviet  Union.
For  one  thing,  without  domestic  reforms  increases  in trade  may  give rise  to
welfare  losses  because  prices  do  not reflect  resource  scarcities  so that  high-
cost  rather  than  low-cost  commodities  may  be exported. For  another  thing,
domestic  reforms  are  needed  to ensure  the  upgrading  of the  Soviet  export
structure.-3-
II.  Price  Setting  in  the  Context  of Economic  Reforms  and Export  Expansion
Prices  in the  Soviet  Union  do  not reflect  resource  scarcities  or
conform  to consumer  demand. The  prices  paid  by consumers  are  divorced  from
producer  prices,  with turnover  taxes  imposed  at variable  rates  separating  the
two. Producer  prices  are  based  on average  costs  often  of  a long  ago  period  as
there  is  an aversion  to  raising  prices. Average  costs  are  calculated  to
include  wages  and  capital  costs,  which  tend  to  understate  the  cost  of capital;
they  do not  compensate  for  the  use  of natural  resources.
At the  same  time.  there  is  no linkage  between  domestic  producer
pricea  and  world  market  prices. As Dr.  Popov  notes,  this  means  that  every
product  effectively  has its  own  exchange  rate.  In  fact,  for  many  products
there  is  more  than  one  exchange  rate  since  in  CMEA  trade  products  are  often
sold  at  different  prices  in trade  with  different  countries.
But  how  to establish  rational  prices? Could  one  set  centrally  prices
that  reflect  resource  scarcities  and  conform  to  consumer  demand? Some
suggested  that  this  could  be accomplished  by solving  on  a giant  computer  a
system  of equations  that  would  incorporate  producer  and  consumer
relationships.  1!
This is  a chimera. The  Soviet  Union  today  has  a sophisticated
economy  with tens  of thousands  of products,  when  different  prices  would  need
to be set  for  different  product  varieties  and,  as far  as  consumer  prices  are
concerned,  for  products  sold  at different  distances  from  tnae  factory.
Furthermore,  technology  is changing  so  that  past  data  on production
I/  Cf.  e.g.  Oscar  Lange,  "The  Computer  and  the  Market,"  in  Morris  Bronstein,
Comparative  Economic  Systems: Models  and  Cases,  Homewood,  Ill.,  Richard
D. Irwin,  1985,  ch. 11.-4-
coefficients  soon  become  outdated. Consumer  tastes  also  change,  giving  rise
to  variations  in  demand.
And  how  about  adopting  world  market  prices? Such  recommendations
have  been  made  for  small  socialist  countries,  such  as  Hungary,  which  can
maximize  welfare  by  adopting  world  market  prices  domestically.  The  Soviet
Union  has  a iarge  domestic  market  and  it  manufactures  products  (e.g.  Lada
automobiles)  that  are  not produced  elsewhere. But,  standardized  commodities
(e.g.  petroleum)  have  a single  world  market  price,  and it  may  be assumed  that
the  Soviet  Union  cannot  affect  the  prices  of the  products  it  imports  (wheat
provides  an exception  to this  conclusion).
World  market  prices  are,  then,  relevant  to the  Soviet  Union  as they
indicate  opportunities  available  internationally.  The  Soviet  Union  has  long
been  isolated  from  the  international  markets,  however,  and  a wholesale
changeover  to  world  market  prices  cannot  be  effected  overnight. While  for
some  commodities  world  market  prices  can  be  adopted  at an early  date,  this  is
not  the  case  for  others. In  the  following,  some  suggestions  are  made  as to
pricing  under  present-day  conditions.
The  domestic  prices  of raw  materials  and  fuels  should  be set  on the
basis  of world  market  prices. In  this  connection,  it  may  be noted  that  world
market  prices  were  used  as  a yardstick  by Stalin  in criticizing  "the  confusion
that  still  reigns  in  the  sphere  of price-fixing  policy":
"Our  business  executives  and  planners  submitted  a proposal  [which]
suggested  fixing  the  price  of a ton  of grain  at practically  the  same  level
as a ton  of cotton  and,  moreover,  the  price  of  a ton  of grain  ^was  taken
equivalent  to  that  of a ton  of baked  bread. In reply  to the  remarks  of
members  of the  Central  Committee  [of  the  Communist  Party]  that  the  price
of a ton  of bread  must  be higher  than  that  of  a ton  of grain,  because  of
the  additional  expense  of milling  and  baking,  and that  cotton  was
generally  much  dearer  than  grain,  as was  also  borne  out  by their  prices  in-5-
the  world, 7arket,  the  authors  of the  proposal  could  find  nothing  coherent
to say."  -
As noted  earlier,  raw  materials  and  fuels  importantly  enter  into
Soviet  exports  while  other  raw  materials  are imported. Adopting  world  market
prices  would  permit  ensuring  specialization  according  to comparative  advantage
and  economizing  with  raw  materials  and  fuels.
World  market  prices  should  also  be used  for  manufactured  exports.
This  means  that  producers  would  receive  the  prices  they  obtain  abroad  times
the  exchange  rate. This  would  contribute  to the  expansion  of exports  that  are
profitable  from  the  point  of view  of the  national  economy  and  would  give
incentives  to  producers  to seek  better  prices  abroad. In turn,  imports  of
manufactured  goods  would  be sold  at prices  obtained  by  adding  a tariff  to the
cif  import  price  expressed  in  terms  of  domestic  currency  at the  exchange  rate.
Different  considerations  apply  to  manufactured  goods  produced  at home
and  sold  in  domestic  markets. These  producte  should  be sold  at prices  that
equate  domestic  demand  and supply. This  would  mean linking  consumer  prices  to
producer  prices  and  permitting  prices  to  adjust  to  demand  and  supply
conditions.
Eventually,  world  market  prices  would  be brought  to bear  on  domestic
prices  in conjunction  with the  liberalization  of imports. But  this  will  be a
long  process  since,  after  several  decades  of strict  import  limitations,  there
is  a pent-up  demand  for  imports  which  cannot  be satisfied  as the  Soviet  Union
does  not  possess  the  foreign  exchange  necessary  to  pay  for  these  imports.
1/  Economic  Problems  of Socialism  in the  USSR,  Moscow,  Foreign  Languages
Publishing  House,  1952,  pp.  24-25.- 6 -
III. Foreign  Exchange  Needs  and  Capital  Inflow
Increases  in the  value  of Soviet  exports  after  1973  resulted  in large
part  from  the  rise  of petroleum  prices  that  brought  the  export  share  of fuels
from  16.2  percent  in 1960  to  47.3  percent  in 1986. With the  recent  fall  in
petroleum  prices,  Soviet  foreign  exchange  earnings  derived  from  fuels  have
declined. Correspondingly,  as Table  1 in  Dr.  Popov's  paper  shows,  the  ratio
of foreign  trade  to  national  income  decreased  in both  1986  and  1987,  and
exports  fared  more  poorly  than  imports  in  both  years. At the same  time,
Soviet  manufactured  goods  are  not  of  world  quality  that  would  permit  replacing
the  lost  fuel  exports.
The  Central  Committee  of the  Communist  Party  of the  USSR  set  out  as a
target  for  the  quality  of  manufactured  goods  to reach  90  percent  of the  world
market  level  by 1990  and  100  percent  by 1993  (Financial  Times,  August  25,
1988). These  targets  appear  unrealistic  if  we consider  that,  according  to
sources  cited  by Dr.  Popov,  on quality  grounds  17-18  percent  of Soviet
manufactur".g  output  is competitive  on the  world  market  under  optimistic
estimates  and 7-8  percent  under  pessimistic  estimates  (p.  9).
At the  same  time,  the  targets  point  to the  need  for  the  increased
importation  of machinery  to improve  product  quality. This  conclusion  is
strengthened  if  we consider  the  need to  replace  outdated  machinery;
reportedly,  the  average  age  of  machinery  in  the  Soviet  Union  is 20  years,
coupared  with 12  years  in the  United  States  and  10  years  in  West  Germany  and
France  (Financial  Times,  August  25,  1988).
In  order  to increase  the  importation  of  machinery  under  present-day
conditions  regarding  exports,  a capital  inflow  would  be needed. As far  as
foreign  borrowing  goes,  this  should  take  the  form  of borrowing  by the  central-7-
authorities  rather  than  by individual  firms. Otherwise,  there  is  the  danger
of excessive  indebtedness  as shown  by the  example  of highly-indebted
developing  countries.
Joint  ventures  offer  advantages  over  borrowing,  however,  for  several
reasons. First,  in the  case  of joint  ventures  there  are  no interest  payment
obligations  and  transfers  of dividends  are  made  from  the  firm's  profits.
Second,  joint  ventures  bring  in  new  technology,  thereby  improving  the
technological  level  and  the  international  competitiveness  of Soviet
enterprise.  Third,  joint  ventures  can  export  through  the  marketing  channels
established  by the  foreign  partner.
In  practice,  some  mixture  of foreign  borrowing  and  joint  ventures  may
be envisaged. While  the  legal  and  the  fiscal  treatment  of joint  ventures  may
be improved  further,  I/  and  one  may  also  endorse  Dr.  Popov's  proposal  that  the
51 percent  domestic  ownership  limitation  be  abolished  (p.  20),  the  experience
of other  countries  indicates  that  the  establishment  of joint  ventures  takes
time. Nor can  it  be expected  that  foreign  interests  would  supply  more than  a
fraction  of the  requirements  of the  Soviet  Union. Correspondingly,  there  is
need  for  external  borrowing  to  provide  foreign  exchange  for  the  increased
importation  of  machinery.
Nevertheless,  over  time,  the  bulk  of the  increment  in foreign
exchange  availabilities  would  have  to come  from  exports. In this  connection,
1/  Cf.  A. M.  Volkov,  "New  Trends  in  World  Economic  Development  and  East-West
Relations,"  paper  prepared  for  the  Conference  on  "Prospects  for  and
Implications  of  Greater  East-West  Cooperation,"  held  at Middlebury
College,  Middlebury,  Vermont  on September  19-24,  1988,  p. 6.-8-
the  question  arises  what  are  the  commodities  where  the  Soviet  Union  may
increase  its  exports.
IV.  The  Prerequisites  of Export  Expansion
We have  seen  that  fuels  account  for  nearly  one-half  of Soviet
exports. Increases  cannot  be foreseen  in regard  to  fuel  exports,  in  part
because  of domestic  supply  limitations  and  in part  because  higher  Soviet
export  volume  would  create  problems  with  OPEC  as it  would  contribute  to  a
further  weakening  of petroleum  prices. Supply  limitations  are  also  appa.
in regard  to the  exports  of raw  materials.
Such  being  the  case,  the  Soviet  Union  would  have  to increase  the
exportation  of  manufactured  goods. In the  short  to  medium  run,  the  best
possibilities  appear  to lie  in increasingly  exporting  raw  materials  and  fuels
in  a processed  form. In such  exportation,  the  availability  of raw  materials
and  fuels  gives  an advantage  to the  Soviet  Union. At the  same  time,  the
technological  processes  of transforming  raw  materials  and  fuels  are  largely.
standardized  and  are  either  available  in the  Soviet  Union  or can  be obtained
from  abroad.
First  of  all,  the  Soviet  Union  could  develop  the  exports  of
petrochemicals,  involving  a partial  shift  from  the  exportation  of petroleum.
There  are  further  possibilities  for  exporting  basic  chemicals  and,  eventually,
chemical  products. Also,  nonferrous  metals  could  be exported  in a processed
form.
The  Soviet  Union  could  not,  an  hould  not,  aim  at the  exportation  of
labor-intensive  products,  such  as textiles,  clothing,  shoes,  and  various
simple  manufactures.  Textiles  and  clothing  are  subject  to the  Multi-fiber
Arrangement  and  all labor-intensive  products  can  be  exported  by less  developed-9-
countries  and  China. These  countries  have  considerably  lower  wages  than  the
Soviet  Union.
With the  upg  sding  of industry,  there  are  further  possibilities  for
Soviet  exports. These  lie  in the  middle  range  of manufacturing  industries
where  the  level  of technological  sophistication  is  moderately  high.  Examples
are  automobiles  (but  this  would  require  considerable  improvements  in  the  Lada,
which  is  presently  exported  in small  quantities  to the  West)  and  relatively
simple  machinery  and  machine  tools.
For  substantially  increasing  manufactured  exports,  however,  certain
conditions  have to  be  met.  This  requires,  first  of all,  establishing  a
realistic  exchange  rate. The present  exchange  rate  between  the  ruble  and  the
dollar  is  an  artificial  creation  that  does  not  correspond  to the  purchasing
power  of the  two  currencies  in international  markets. Thus,  while  the
official  value  of the  ruble  is  greater  than  that  of the  dollar,  the  opposite
is the  case  as far  as the  ruble  and  the  dollar  exchange  rates  of Hungary  and
Poland  are  concerned. In fact,  Gne  ruble  was  worth  27  Hungarian  forints  on
June  5, 1987  while  the  dollar  was  worth  47.5  forints  at the  exchange  rate  of
the  Hungarian  National  Bank. This  means  an implicit  exchange  rate  of 1.76
rubles  for  the  dollar  as  against  the  official  exchange  rate  of 1.55  dollars
for  the  ruble.  1!
The  exchange  rate  should  be set  to  make  marginal  exports
profitable.  As in  the  Soviet  Union  marginal  exports  are  manufactured  goods,
1/  V. Belov,  "Socialist  Economic  Integration  in  Its  Present  Stage,"  paper
prepared  for  the  Conference  on "Prospects  for  and Implications  of Greater
East-West  Cooperation,"  held  at  Middlebury  College,  Middlebury,  Vermont  on
September  19-24,  1988,  p. 15.- 10  -
this  can  be  accomplished  by calculating  the  domestic  cost  of foreign  exchange
for  manufactured  exports  and  setting  the  exchange  rate  on this  basis.
Such  a  method  of exchange  rate  determination  was  used in  Hungary
following  the  1968  reforms,  except  that  the  average  domestic  cost  of foreign
exchange  rather  than  its  marginal  cost  was  calculated.  This  procedure  did  not
provide  sufficient  incentives  for  exports  while  necessitating  subsidies  for
exports  that  produced  foreign  exchange  at  a  domestic  cost  higher  than  the
average.
Increasing  the  domestic  price  of exports  will  not suffice,  however,
under  present  day  conditions  because  of pent-up  domestic  demand  for
manufactured  products. Also,  exporting  involves  considerable  uncertainty  so
that  the  fulfilment  of the  production  plan  may  be jeopardized  if  exports  do
not  work  out  as expected. Finally,  exports  have  high  quality  requirements
that  involves  a considerable  extra  effort.
At the  same  time,  foreign  exchange  has  a  scarcity  value  that  exceeds
the  exchange  rate  under  conditions  of import  control. Thus,  in  order  to
encourage  export  expansion,  consideration  may be  given  to  enlarging  the  scope
of the  existing  foreign  exchange  retention  scheme  for  exports. This  would
involve  increasing  foreign  exchange  allotments  to  exporters  and  allocating
part  of the  allotment  to the  produceri  of inputs  for  export  manufacture.
The latter  point  is  of particular  importance,  given  the  difficulties
exporters  encounter  in  obtaining  inputs  for  export  production  in  general  and
inputs  of appropriate  quality  in  particular.  These  difficulties  may  be
obviated  if the  producers  of inputs  for  export  production  (indirect  exporters)
receive  a foreign  exchange  allotment.- 11 -
One  may  set  the  foreign  exchange  allotment  as a percentage  of net
foreign  exchange  earnings  from  exports. This involves  deducting  from  fob
export  value  the  cif  cost  of imported  inputs  as well  as the  fob  value  of
materials  that  would  otherwise  have  been  exported. The  deduction  of exports
foregone  (e.g.  that  of fuels  used in  producing  petrochemicals  for  export)  is
necessary  since  otherwise  the  increment  in foreign  exchange  availabilities  due
to  manufactured  exports  would  be  overstated. Subsequently,  the  foreign
exchange  allotment  can  be divided  between  direct  and indirect  exporters  on the
basis  of their  contribution  to  net foreign  exchange  earnings.
Foreign  exchange  allotments  could  be  used to import  machinery  as well
as intermediate  products. One  may  also  envisage  an auction  market  for  foreign
exchange  since  some  firms  may  not  utilize  their  entire  foreign  exchange
allotment. This  would  permit  easing  the  foreign  exchange  shortage  under  which
Soviet  firms  operate.
It  would  further  be desirable  to  increase  the  number  of  firms  that
can  directly  trade  abroad. Dr.  Popov  noted  that  in 1987  22  ministries  and
departments,  as well  as 77  associations,  enterprises,  and  organizations  were
given  the  right  to carry  out  export-import  operations  directly  in  foreign
markets,  accounting  for  12  percent  of exports  (p.  14). This  proportion  should
be increased  so  as to  ensure  a direct  contact  between  producers  and  foreign
markets. In the  absence  of such  contacts,  it is  difficult  to  ascertain  the
changing  needs  of markets  abroad.
At the  same  time,  replacing  foreign  trade  enterprises  by ministries
and  ministry  departments  in  carrying  out  export  trade  will  not suffice. It is
the  producing  enterprises  that  should  have  foreign  contacts  rather  than  the- 12  -
supervisory  organizations.  Decentralization  in  the  trade  area,  in  turn,
should  be  part  and  parcel  of decentralization  in the  overall  economic  sphere.
V.  Decentralization,  Profit  Incentives  and  Competition
The  decentralization  of  decision  making  is  necessary  to ensure  that
supply  responds  to demand. This  is relevant  not  only  at the  consumer  level
but  also  at different  stages  of fabrication.  Centralized  planning  cannot
ensure  the  equalization  of demand  and supply,  in part  because  of the
impossibility  to  collect  information  on all  products  at the  center  and in  part
because  of  continuous  changes  that  occur  in  needs  and  availabilities.
At the  same  time,  for  producers  to respond  to  users'  needs,  they
should  aim  at maximizing  profits  that  bring  the  firm's  own  interests  into
harmony  with  the society's  interests  in  efficient  resource  allocation.  Profit
maximization  involves  minimizing  costs  and  catering  to  demand. Setting
production  targets  from  above  would  interfere  with the  pursuit  of these
objectives.
In  order  to  ensure  that  firms  maximize  profits,  firm  managers  should
be provided  appropriate  incentives.  This  involves  basing  the  managers'
bonuses  on profits  rather  than  on the  subjective  judgment  of supervisory
organizaticGn5.
For  profit  maximization  to lead  to  efficient  resource  allocation,
there  is further  need  for  competition  among  producers.  Competition  can  be
ensured  in the  Soviet  Union  whose  large  domestic  market  can support  a number
of  efficient  size  producers  in  most  industries.  This  contrasts  with  the  case
of small  socialist  countries,  such  as Hungary,  where  the  domestic  market  can
support  only  one  or two  efficient  size  producers  in each  industry.- 13  -
In conclusion,  emphasis  should  be given  to the  interdependence  of
rational  prices,  decentralization,  profit  maximization,  incentives,  and
competition.  For  commodities  produced  domestically,  the  establishment  of
rational  prices  requires  equating  demand  and  supply. This,  in turn,
necessitates  the  decentralization  of decision  making  and  profit  maximization
by the  firm. At the  same  time,  managers  have  to be  provided  with appropriate
incentives  in  order  to  ensure  that  firms  maximize  profits. Furthermore,  there
is  need  for  competition  to guarantee  that  profit  maximization  leads  to the
efficient  allocation  of resources. Expressed  differently,  under  the
conditions  indicated,  the  working  of the  market  system  in a socialist  economy
simultaneously  ensures  efficient  resource  allocation  and  the  establishment  of
rational  prices.
The  described  provisions  go beyond  the  measures  included  in the
document  approved  by the  Supreme  Soviet  on June  30,  1987. This  document,
entitled  "Basic  Provisions  for  Fundamentally  Reorganizing  Economic  Management"
represents  a half-way  house  between  central  planning  and  market  socialism.
While  it  contains  a  modicum  of decentralization,  "the  basic  provisions  stress
that  the  economy  will  continue  to  be centrally  planned  and  managed  as 'a
unified  national  economy  complex'  directed  toward  carrying  out  the  party's
economic  policies."  1/  Also,  the  possibilities  for  competition  would  be
limited  "by  accelerating  the  ongoing  process  of amalgamating  enterprises  into
production  and  science-production  associations  and  creating  large  new
1/  Gertrude  E. Schroeder,  "Gorbachev's  Economic  Reforms"  in  Ronald D.
Liebovitz  ed.,  Gorbachev's  New  Thinking,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  Ballinger
Publishing  Company  for  the  International  Institute  for  Economic
Advancement,  1988,  p. 56.- 14  -
groupings  called  'state  production  associations,'  which  integrate  entities
engaged  in  all  phases  of the  reseasch-production-marketing  claim."  1/
An additional  consideration  is that  rational  prices  of products
presuppose  that  there  are  also  rational  prices  for  the  factors  of
production.  This,  in  turn,  requires  establishing  markets  for  these  factors
where  prices  equate  demand  and  supply. Thus,  markets  are  needed  for  capital,
labor,  and  natural  resources.
Also,  for  the  rational  pricing  of productive  factors,  the  existing
excess  demand  for  these  factors  will  need to  be eliminated.  Excess  demand
originates  in  the  desire  of the  firms  to  expand  that  is  not  checked  by
financial  limitations  on the  expansion. Utilizing  an expression  introduced  by
Jknos  Kornai,  firms  face  a "soft"  budget  constraint  in  the  sense  that  they  can
expect  their  losses  to be financed  from  the  government  budget.
Hardening  the  budget  constraint  means  making  firms  fully  responsible
for  the  consequences  of their  actions. Inappropriate  actions  may,  then,  lead
to bankruptcy,  if losses  accumulate  as a result. Thus,  one  needs  the  carrot
as  well  as the  stick  of competition,  with firms  benefiting  from  making  profits
and  suffering  the  consequences  of losses.
The  discussion  so far  pertained  to industry. It  has  been  recognized
that  agriculture  also  needs  a farreaching  transformation  in  order  to fully
utilize  its  production  potential.  The recent  decision  to lease  land  to
individual  farmers  up to 50  years  represents  an important  move  towards
introducing  greater  efficiency  in  farming  (Washington  Post,  August  27,
1/  Ibid,  p. 58  --  For  a  detailed  discussion  of the  Soviet  reforms,  see  Edward
A. Hewett,  Reforming  the  Soviet  Economy,  Washington,  D.C.  The  Brookings
Institution,  1988.- 15  -
1988). It  would  further  be necessary  to transform  the  huge  cooperatives  and
state  farms  into  smaller,  profit-oriented  units.
In this  connection,  reference  may be  made  to the  experience  of
Hungary  where  the  operation  of profit-oriented  units  in  agriculture  has  led  to
a  considerable  expansion  of production.  But  Hungary  is  also  an example  of the
lack  of success  of  half-way  houses  in industry  where  continued  state
interven:ion  has  not permitted  the  full-fledged  development  of market
socialism,  with  adverse  effects  on production  and  exports.
VI.  Trade  Relations  with  Other  Countries
The  question  arises  what  are  the  implications  of policy  changes  in
the  Soviet  Union  for  trade  relations  with  other  countries. This  question  will
be considered  in  the  following  in  regard  to the  Council  for  Mutual  Economic
Assistance  (CMEA)  and  for  trade  with capitalist  countries,  among  which  the
United  States  requires  special  attention.
Decentralization  in  the  economic  system  of the  Soviet  Union  also
requires  decentralizing  trade  with the  CMEA  countries. While  at the  end  of
1987  only  500  of  nearly  40,000  Soviet  firms  established  direct  links  with
firms  in the  CMEA  countries,  1/  trade  on the  basis  of intergovernmental
contracts  would  have  to be increasingly  replaced  by  market  relations  among
firms.
Also,  in the  manufacturing  sector,  trade  may increasingly  take  the
form  of intra-industry  specialization.  This  would  ensure  the  exploitation  of
1/  Ivan  Ivanov,  "Restructuring  the  Mechanism  of Foreign  Economic  Relations  in
the  USSR,"  Soviet  Economy,  3:3,  1987,  p. 207.- 16  -
large  scale  economies  associated  with longer  production  runs  and the  use  of
specialized  machinery  as firms  narrow  their  product  composition.
There  are  further  possibilitieis  for  joint  ventures  among  the  CMEA
countries.  As of  November  1987,  orly four  joint  ventures  were created  with
firms  in  CMEA  countries  and  letters  of intent  were signed  for  eight  others.
11  Yet,  there  are  considerable  opportunities  for  joint  ventures  among  firms
that  use  different  technologies.
In  the  past,  trade  and  joint  ventures  among  the  CMEA  countries  were
limited  by the  lack  of a convertible  currency. As the  surplus  in  bilateral
trade  between  two  CMEA  countries  could  not  be  used to  finance  a deficit  with a
third  CMEA  country,  there  was  an incentive  to retrench  rather  than  to expand
exports.
As a first  step  to remedy  this  situation,  a clearing  of bilateral
balances  in CMEA  trade  should  be established.  Next,  the  resulting
multilateral  balances  should  be paid  for in  convertible  currencies.  In the
final  step,  the  currencies  of the  CMEA  countries  should  be  made  convertible.
At the  same  time,  the  requirements  for  convertibility  should  not  be
underestimated.  In  the  absence  of balanced  trade,  with  allowance  made for  the
inflow  of foreign  capital,  and sufficient  foreign  exchange  reserves,  there  is
the  danger  that  a run is  created  on the  currency,  precipitating  a substantial
decline  in its  value.
This  danger  is  especially  apparent  under  present  conditions  in the
Soviet  Union,  where  exports  do not  appreciably  respond  to  changes  in the  value
1/  Ibid,  p. 209.-17-
of the  currency. Thus,  domestic  policy  reforms  providing  for  an elastic
supply  of exports  is  a precondition  for  currency  convertibility.
Convertible  currencies  are  used  to settle  balances  in  trade  with  the
capitalist  countries. But  Soviet  trade  with these  countries  has  been  limited
by the  availability  of exports  that  could  compete  in their  markets. Thus,  the
first  priority  is to increase  the  scope  of commodities  that  are  competitive  in
the  markets  of capitalist  countries.
Geographical  proximity  favors  Soviet  trade  with the  European  Economic
Community.  Apart  from  product  availabilities  for  export,  in  recent  years  this
trade  suffered  from  the  relatively  poor  economic  performance  of the  Common
Market  countries.  With the  completion  of the  internal  market  in  the  EC by
1992,  a resurgence  of growth  is foreseen,  however.
Geographical  proximity  also favors  trade  between  the  Eastern  parts  of
the  Soviet  Union  and  Japan. The  question  is  however  if the  Soviet  Union  can
compete  on the  Japanese  market  in  middle  range  manufactured  products,  where
not  only  does  Japan  have  a strong  position  but  there  is also  competition  by
the  East  Asian  newly  industrializing  countries.
It  has  been  said  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  few  possibilities  to
export  to the  United  States  because  of distance. This statement  applies  to
fuels  and  raw  materials  where  the  Common  Market  countries  provide  nearby
markets. But  transportation  costs  have  limited  importance  for  manufactured
goods  as indicated  by the  success  of Japan  and  the  newly  industrializing
countries  in  the  U.S.  market. Once the  Soviet  Union  establishes  a competitive
export  structure,  it should  be  able  to sell  in the  United  States.
As noted  earlier,  establishing  joint  ventures  would  help  the  export
promotion  effort. In this  connection,  U.S.  firms  may  play  a particularly- 18  -
important  role  as they  have  considerable  experience  with joint  ventures  in
Western  Europe  and in  developing  countries.
At the  same  time,  Soviet  exports  to the  United  States  are  limited  by
the  lack  of application  of the  mfn  clause. This  should  change  with  the
greater  openness  of the  Soviet  economy,  increased  emigration,  as well  as
agreements  on reducing  nuclear  and  conventional  armaments.
VII.  Conclusions
In this  paper,  attention  has  been  given  to the  policy  conditions  of
changes  in  Soviet  foreign  trade. The  discussion  has  centered  on price  reform,
foreign  exchange  needs,  and  capital  inflow,  the  prerequisites  of export
expansion,  the  interdependence  of the  reform  measures,  and  trade  relations
with  other  countries.
It  has  been  suggested  that  domestic  policies  need  to change  in order
to ensure  efficiency  in foreign  trade  and  to provide  exports  of high
quality. The  first  prerequisite  is the  establishment  of rational  prices.
This  objective  may be pursued  by  adopting  world  market  prices  for  raw
materials  and  fuels,  having  the  exporters  of  manufactured  goods  receive  the
prices  they  obtain  abroad,  setting  the  domestic  prices  of imports  at world
market  prices  plus  a tariff,  and  establishing  market  clearing  prices  for
manufactured  products  that  are  produced  and  sold  domestically.
Eventually,  world  market  prices  would  be brought  to bear  on domestic
prices  in  conjunction  with  the  liberalization  of imports,  but  this  will  be a
long  process  since  the  pent-up  demand  for  imports  cannot  be satisfied  from
available  foreign  exchange. At the  same  time,  given  the  limitations  of
raising  fuel  and  raw  material  exports,  it  would  be necessary  to increase  the
exports  of manufactured  goods  where  quality  provides  a constraint.  To upgrade- 19  -
quality,  there  is  need  for  foreign  machinery,  the  purchase  of which  would
necessitate  external  borrowing  and joint  ventures. This  would,  then,  help to
expand  exports  that  will  have  to provide  the  bulk  of the  increment  in foreign
exchange  availability  over  time.
There  are  possibilities  for  exporting  fuels  and  raw  materials  in
processed  form. The.Soviet  Union  should  also  have  possibilities  in  middle-
range  products,  such  as  automobiles  and  relatively  simple  machinery  and
machine  tools. It is  at a  disadvantage,  however,  in exporting  labor-intensive
manufactures.
Establishing  a realistic  exchange  rate  is  a pre-condition  for
expanding  the  exports  of  manufactured  goods. It  would  further  be desirable  to
inrrease  foreign  exchange  retention  quotas  and  to  allot  these  to  direct  and
indirect  exporters  alike. Finally,  the  scope  of firms  that  directly  trade
abroad  would  need  to  be substantially  enlarged.
The  decentralization  of decision  making  in foreign  trade  should  be
accompanied  by decentralization  in the  domestic  economy,  to be  complemented  by
the  introduction  of the  profit  motive  and  competi_ion.  In fact,  rational
prices,  decentralization,  profit  maximization,  incentives  to  managers,  and
competition  are  interdependent  and  they  will  have  to  be pursued  simultaneously
for  efficient  resource  allocation.  At the  same  time,  improvements  would  need
to be  made in the  conditions  under  which  agriculture  operates.
Decentralization  of the  economic  system  also  requires  decentralizing
trade  with the  CMEA  countries. At the  same  time,  the  expansion  and
rationalization  of this  trade  would  require  the  clearing  of bilateral  balances
and  the  settlement  of  multilateral  balances  in  convertible  currencies,  with
the  currencies  of the  CMEA  countries  eventually  also  becoming  convertible.- 20  -
Geographical  proximity  favors  Soviet  trade  with  the  Common  Market
countries.  Nevertheless,  once  a competitive  export  structure  is established,
there  will  be possibilities  for  exporting  manufactured  goods  to the  U.S.
market. In the  meantime,  joint  ventures  with  American  firms  hold  considerable
promise.
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